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NO FAULT INSURANCE IN AVIATION PRODUCTS
AND SERVICES-ONE INSURER'S VIEWPOINT
JOHN

V.

BRENNAN*

T

HERE HAVE been numerous articles and books written on
the general subject of no-fault liability and it is not my intention to bore you with an extensive analysis of that material. You
have heard it all before. Instead, I will give you one underwriter's
opinion regarding no-fault insurance for aviation products and services and hope that it will be of some value. I must emphasize "one
underwriter's opinion," since it is not unusual for another underwriter to have difficulty with my logic and draw a different conclusion from the same set of facts.
To begin, it will be helpful to review the statements of those favoring no-fault aviation insurance in order to identify areas of
agreement or disagreement. Congressman Milford cites aircraft
accident investigation as one of the problem areas needing attention. I agree. Aircraft accident investigation has developed into a
science unto itself and the United States leads the world in this field.
At the site of every airline accident there is a highly trained and
professional government investigation team which will retrieve and
analyze wreckage, review information contained in the cockpit
voice recorder and digital flight data recorder, and ultimately determine the probable cause of accident. When a general aviation accident occurs, however, there is no cockpit voice recorder or flight
data recorder to aid in determining the cause of accident and you
rarely see a professional investigation team at the site. The lack
of sophisticated investigations of general aviation accidents has
created great risk, not only for the flying public, but also for the
aircraft manufacturer. Too often a series of accidents must occur
before a defect in an aircraft or aircraft system is discovered. Of
* Mr. Brennan is Executive Vice-President of United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc.
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less consequence, but also important, is the increased difficulty
and additional cost necessary to defend a manufacturer in a products liability action arising out of an accident which occurred some
time ago and in which the investigation was minimal or incomplete.
There is one aspect of the accident investigation problem, as
described by Congressman Milford, with which I must disagree. I
do not believe that the threat of litigation inhibits an investigation
in any way. On the contrary, it can be a great impetus to intensify
the investigation. Rather than impeding the flow of safety information, the threat of litigation hastens that flow. Manufacturers will
readily provide information to prevent an accident and additional
information after an accident to avoid any notion of a cover-up or
a withholding of data indicating malfeasance. To illustrate this
point, I quote the following from a products liability article appearing in the March 30, 1975 edition of The New York Times:
Faced with the possibility of expensive product liability settlements
and recalls that might engulf a firm's entire product line, companies have taken a more prudent and cautious approach to product
defects. In the automotive sector, for example, several of the latest
recalls have been initiated not because of consumer complaints
about a failing part, but because the company developed datausually during its own extended product use testing-that suggested the possibility of future failure.'
Anyone who has been involved in aviation liability, or has done
any research concerning aviation liability, knows that our common
law tort system and our adversary trial system have made enormous contributions to our knowledge of accident causation. By
focusing attention on hitherto unknown facts concerning the cause
of an accident, knowledge is gained, corrections are made, and
aviation safety is improved. Certainly, in view of recent publicity,
one cannot argue that government regulation alone is all that is
necessary to encourage and insure safety in aviation.
I must admit that the accident investigation area is one in which
the aviation insurance industry has been derelict in its duty and can
be justifiably criticized. The attitude historically was that aircraft
accident investigation was solely the government's responsibility.
Aviation insurance underwriters now recognize that it is also our
responsibility and, after developing the necessary technological ex1 N.Y.

Times, Mar. 30, 1975, (Business and Financing), at 4, col. 1.
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pertise, we now provide professional air safety investigators for all
types of aircraft accidents.
Another problem area mentioned by Congressman Milford is
aviation liability insurance premiums. He states:
Aviation insurance underwriters are becoming reluctant to provide
products liability insurance to aviation manufacturers-at any price.
Those that are insured must pay extremely high premiums.
This is a surprising statement in view of the current state of the
aviation insurance market. I am unaware of any major aviation insurance underwriter who is unwilling to entertain a products liability risk. Air transport manufacturers such as Boeing, McDonnell
Douglas, and Lockheed are able to purchase limits of liability up to
300,000,000 dollars for less than one half of one percent of their
gross annual sales. Furthermore, rates and premiums for this category of aircraft manufacturer are lower now than they were five
years ago. General aviation manufacturers such as Beech, Cessna,
and Piper are able to purchase the necessary products liability
coverage for premiums ranging from one and one half to three and
one half percent of their gross annual sales. Premiums in the manufacturing category have remained rather constant during the past
few years. On the basis of current experience, some aviation products liability premiums should increase in the near future but not
dramatically.
While properly noting that insurance costs are passed on to the
public consumer, Congressman Milford states that "soaring costs
are forcing some segments of general aviation out of business." Since
someone might well infer from that statement that general aviation
premiums are soaring, I should like to take this opportunity to set
the record straight. General aviation aircraft owners and operators
are able to purchase all the insurance they desire at rates that are
approximately forty per cent of what they were five years ago. This
is true in spite of the fact that during the same period there have
been between 600 and 700 fatal accidents per year and between
1300 and 1400 fatalities per year.' Additionally, through this same
period, the general aviation industry has been enjoying its greatest
growth. Aircraft sales have never been higher. If some segments of
general aviation are being forced out of business due to increased
21974
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costs, I suggest that one look to the cost of fuel, higher interest
rates, taxes, and the rate of inflation as causal factors.
Airline insurance rates are currently twenty-five to thirty-five percent of the rates in effect five years ago. These favorable rates apply
in spite of the fact that there were only 146 fatalities arising out of
U.S. airline operations in 1970, whereas 1974 saw a record 467
fatalities.'
The next problem identified by Congressman Milford is the
threat of business termination of major segments of the aviation industry due to single catastrophic aircraft accidents. No one can
deny the existence of this threat, but that is precisely why there is
an insurance industry-to spread the risk among those similarly
situated. The aviation insurance market has participants throughout the world who compete aggressively for every aviation risk,
whether the insured is a major manufacturer, airline, or member
of the general aviation community. This market has developed
more aviation insurance capacity at lower rates today than at any
time in history. Additionally, it cannot be argued that liability
insurance insulates manufacturers from the consequences of producing unsafe products. On the contrary, it serves to make them
more safety conscious since no underwriter will knowingly write
insurance on poorly designed or carelessly made products.
The last problem identified by Congressman Milford is that aircraft technology and product improvement are being seriously
hampered as a result of civil liability lawsuits. It is true that more
time is now being spent on such things as human factor engineering, fail-safe design and crashworthiness, but is not that as it should
be? Are not new developments in these areas to be considered product improvements and advances in aircraft technology? We have
proven that we can build the biggest, fastest, and most economical
aircraft in the world. Should we not work with equal vigor to improve the safety and survivability factors of these aircraft in which
so much of the world's population places its trust each day? The
United States enjoys a virtual monopoly on aircraft production,
and the way to maintain our position of leadership is to concentrate as much of our energies on safety technology as we do on
efficiency and performance technology.
The specter of products liability lawsuits as well as environId. at 37, Appendix A.

1975]

THE INSURER'S VIEW

mental lawsuits hangs over the foreign aircraft manufacturers just
as it does over their U.S. colleagues. In fact, many nations are now
raising the level of their damage awards in addition to adopting a
similar approach to our products liability law. These developments
do not indicate that the leadership position of the United States
aircraft manufacturers is in any way being jeopardized by the common law tort system.
Congressman Milford goes on to explain how aviation is unique
as a mode of transportation. Who can disagree? He describes how
the aviation industry is very closely regulated by the federal government and adds that this protective measure makes common law
recovery unnecessary. It seems to me that the thing that makes
aviation unique is that it is dramatically less forgiving of error
than any other mode of transportation and that is why the safeguards of our common law tort system should apply. Remove or
minimize the substantial consequences flowing from the acts of the
government as well as the aircraft manufacturers and operators
and you have eliminated a major deterrent to unsafe conduct. Because of the sometimes overwhelming economic pressures generated by his business, a manufacturer or aircraft operator might engage in unsound or imprudent practices which might not otherwise be contemplated. Likewise, a government employee under
political pressure or as an act of friendship, might delay or forego
a decision relating to safety which can have a devastating effect.
Another proponent of aviation no-fault has stated the following:
The major argument for no-fault insurance is that it will reverse
the present trend for juries and courts to award excessive settlements to claimants which has resulted in increasing insurance
premiums for all. Unless there is some restraint on these large settlements, the cost of insurance will continue to soar."
We have all heard this story before but has anyone taken the
time to check the facts behind the rhetoric? According to Jury
Verdict Research, Inc. of Cleveland, Ohio, awards in serious personal injury cases have increased nearly twenty-eight percent since
1970. During the same period, the Consumer Price Index has risen
a whopping thirty-eight percent! There is always a great deal of
publicity concerning the occasional multi-million dollar damage
4
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award leaving the impression that these awards are the rule rather
than the exception. No one can debate the fact that the awards and
settlements have been on the increase, but the record does not indicate that these increases are unwarranted.
Workmen's compensation laws are usually cited as a good example of no-fault liability in action and that is an accurate description. They provide for the efficient distribution of funds to the
injured party, but I seriously question whether they act as a deterrent to unsafe working conditions. Unfortunately, workmen's compensation insurance has so diluted the safety concern of employers
that many times worker's injuries are just another item on the union
negotiating list. In many cases, it is cheaper for the employer to
pay for his workmen's compensation insurance and run the risk
of employee injuries than it is to incur the substantial cost of modernizing his equipment and improving the safety environment of
his facilities. If this was not the case, it would not have been necessary for Congress to pass the Occupational Health and Safety Act
in order to reduce the number and severity of worker injuries. Hopefully, this will provide the necessary incentive to foster job safety
that was obviously lacking in the workmen's compensation laws.
Now I would like to review some of the abuses of the common
law tort system highlighted by many no-fault advocates and certainly in need of redress. One abuse is that practiced by some
aviation underwriters who, upon presentation of a claim, either
search high and low for some reason to deny the claim, or initiate
subrogation actions, cross claims, or impleaders without adequate
justification in order to limit or reduce their liability. Another
abusive practice by some aviation underwriters is entering into
so-called "guarantee agreements" which involve inducing claimants injured in aircraft accidents to sue the manufacturer and then,
in effect, finance and participate in some form in the recovery.
This procedure is questionable at best from an ethical standpoint,
and at worst may be illegal. Once these insurance companies realize
the overall cost they are adding to the system, as well as the very
detrimental effect they are having on their particular business,
these abuses should cease. The successful aviation insurer must
investigate accidents, make a very early determination of liability,
and offer prompt and equitable settlements when indicated. Litigation should be the exception rather than the rule.
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Additional abuses are perpetrated by plaintiffs' attorneys. Much
publicity has been given to the contingent fee system, most of
which has been critical. We have all heard that the contingent
fee is the poor man's key to the courthouse, but some plaintiffs'
attorneys have turned it into their key to the bank. For example,
recently my company settled a claim involving the death of an
airline passenger in an accident which occurred four months earlier. The total sum of the settlement was 325,000 dollars. The
so-called reasonable attorney's fee allowed was 108,333 dollars.
The services rendered by this attorney were as follows:
(1) The service of a summons and complaint;
(2) Attendance at an NTSB hearing which lasted two days;
(3) The receipt of some interrogatories for which answers were
not prepared;
(4) The furnishing of income and dependency information;
(5) Three settlement discussions; and
(6) The preparation of an order of compromise and a general
release.
This attorney would have difficulty in justifying more than twenty
hours of actual work on this uncontested claim. Incidentally, the
exhorbitant fee exacted by this attorney and approved by the federal court came out of the pocket of a widow and two minor children.
There are also some plaintiffs' attorneys who abuse the system
by unduly delaying the acceptance of very equitable settlement
offers in order to justify their unconscionable fees or to allow the
settlement to take place during a year which is more favorable to
them from a personal tax standpoint. These abuses cannot be tolerated.
Abuses also occur on the defense side, although they are less
inflammatory. Too many defense attorneys are going through the
paper work ritual of answering complaints, serving interrogatories,
attending drawn out depositions, all of which lead nowhere but
add greatly to the cost of the system. Too often the insurance
company is advised that its insured is not liable, so the paperwork
machine is put in motion and all the necessary preparations for a
successful defense are commenced. A few years later, this same
insurance company is advised from the courthouse steps that the
case has gone sour, the judge is the wrong judge, and the jury is
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the wrong jury. Needless to say, the legal expenses at that point,
as well as the cost to settle the claim, have both increased dramatically. Much earlier determinations of liability can and must be
made.
With the right cooperation among professionals, more claims
can be handled in less time for less cost than has been the case.
There has been a tremendous improvement in this area in recent
years, but much more needs to be done if we are to meet our public
trust and maintain the common law tort system. Unless those who
have custody of the common law tort system-the insurance industry, the bench, and the bar-cooperate to reduce and eliminate these abuses, ultimately some form of no-fault liability system is likely to find acceptance, notwithstanding its adverse effect
on safety. One only has to look at the malpractice problem facing
the medical and health care industry in this country to appreciate
the disaster that can befall a profession that fails to adequately
discipline its membership.
The demand for a no-fault liability system does not come from
the public, but rather from the ivory towers of academia, some
well-meaning but misinformed legislators, or some insurance or industry committees, wherein the concept is seized upon as another
way to limit corporate risk and improve financial forecast. I
have not heard a claimant or an ordinary citizen anywhere favor
the removal or lessening of individual responsibility, let alone
corporate responsibility, and I do not believe the public is willing
to reward the negligent and incompetent at the expense of the conscientious and the responsible. One can see a firsthand illustration
by witnessing a products liability trial. Even though the judge has
charged the jury with respect to strict liability, a no-fault concept,
the jury still makes its determination on the basis of fault. Most
successful plaintiffs' attorneys, while proving the existence of the
necessary defect in a strict liability case, will labor hard to establish that the defendant was at fault, since juries want to hold someone responsible only if they can find culpability.
If our fantastic economic growth, new knowledge, and technological innovations have made us so impersonal and materialistic
that we focus only on the most efficient way to distribute some compensation to accident victims, rather than how to prevent the accident in the first place, our future is sad to contemplate. The pri-
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mary goal should be to promote the public welfare by preventing
accidents and thereby saving lives and avoiding injuries. Secondarily, and of much less consequence, is the monetary reimbursement
of the victims of aircraft accidents. This does not reflect so much
the unimportance of adequate compensation, as it does the importance of life and health. A no-fault system may accomplish
the secondary objective of monetary reimbursement at the expense
of sacrificing the primary objective of saving lives and avoiding
injuries. The expedient thing and the right thing are seldom the same
thing.

